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Abstract 
 The proceedings against Al Mahdi constitute a landmark precedent in the prosecution of  crimes 
against cultural heritage, inside and outside the International Criminal Court. This article examines the 
Prosecution’s overarching strategy at the confirmation of  charges stage, where emphasis was placed on 
the consequences that the destruction of  the shrines in Timbuktu had for the local population. It is 
suggested that this anthropocentric line of  reasoning was historically inaccurate and strategically short-
sighted. Using the example of  the destruction of  the Buddhas of  Bamiyan, the article explains how, in 
the long run, this anthropocentric approach can restrict the capacity to prosecute crimes committed 
against cultural heritage per se, and undermine the conceptual foundation for the special protection 
given to cultural property. 
French translation  
La procédure contre Al Mahdi constitue un précédent historique dans la poursuite des crimes contre le 
patrimoine culturel, à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de la Cour Pénale Internationale. Cet article examine la 
stratégie globale de l'Accusation au stade de la confirmation des charges, où l'accent a été mis sur les 
conséquences que la destruction des sanctuaires de Tombouctou a eu pour la population locale. 
L'article suggère que le raisonnement anthropocentrique était historiquement inexacte et une stratégie à 
court terme. À l'aide de l'exemple de la destruction des Bouddhas de Bamiyan, l'article explique 
comment, à long terme, cette approche anthropocentrique peut restreindre la capacité de poursuivre les 
crimes commis contre le patrimoine culturel en tant que tel et nuire à la base conceptuelle de la 
protection spéciale accordée aux biens culturels. 
Spanish translation  
El proceso contra Al Mahdi supone un precedente histórico en la persecución de los crímenes contra el 
patrimonio cultural, dentro y fuera de la Corte Penal Internacional. Este artículo examina la estrategia 
global de la fiscalía en la fase de confirmación de los cargos, en la que se puso énfasis en las 
consecuencias que la destrucción de los templos de Tombuctú tuvo para la población local. El artículo 
sugiere que este razonamiento antropocentrista fue inexacto históricamente y corto de miras desde un 
punto de vista estratégico. Tomando como ejemplo de la destrucción de los budas de Bamiyán, el 
artículo explica cómo, a largo plazo, este enfoque antropocéntrico puede restringir la capacidad de 
perseguir crímenes cometidos contra el patrimonio cultural per se, así como socavar las bases 
conceptuales de la protección especial que se debe dar al patrimonio cultural. 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Introduction 
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, an ethnic Tuareg and Malian citizen in his thirties, is recognized as 
possessing a deep knowledge of  Islam; indeed, he was a teacher of  Islam prior to his membership in 
the militant Islamist group Ansar Dine (‘Defenders of  the Faith’) and his involvement in the 
destruction of  historic and religious sites in Timbuktu. He was arrested in Niger and surrendered to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in September 2015, the first suspect to be transferred to The Hague 
in connection with the armed conflict in Mali. More significantly, he was also the first person to be 
charged solely with the crime of  directing attacks against cultural heritage. Some previous cases 
involving the damage and destruction of  cultural or historic sites had been dealt with by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,  but never before had a person been 1
brought to international justice on these grounds alone. Hence, the Al Mahdi case is bound to become 
a reference for future prosecutions of  attacks against cultural heritage and, more broadly, for cases that 
centre on crimes not against persons but against property. As such, its legacy should be closely 
scrutinized. 
Precisely because the charges against Al Mahdi centred solely on attacks against cultural 
heritage, the decision of  the Office of  the Prosecutor to devote attention and resources to this case 
provoked controversy, with some labelling it a “victimless crime”.  This is not an accurate description 2
as the destruction and damage of  historical and religious buildings can lead to personal and material 
harm. In fact, the ICC Trial Chamber approved nine applications from persons wishing to participate 
as victims in the proceedings.  However, as this article argues, the Prosecution’s focus at the 3
confirmation of  charges hearing on the “intangible” side of  the events – the extent to which the 
population has been affected by the destruction – was not concurrent with the history of  this crime 
and was strategically short-sighted.  
An anthropocentric reading, that is, one that focuses on the impact it has on persons, of  the 
crime sets limits on the prosecution’s range of  action. This is something of  which to be mindful 
because, as the sole precedent for the prosecution of  crimes against cultural heritage and not persons, 
the Al Mahdi case will have consequences for the future internal functioning of  the ICC when dealing 
with crimes against cultural heritage, other types of  property or the environment. This is particularly 
important as the Office of  the Prosecutor has recently indicated that it wishes to focus on acts that 
harm the environment.  The case is also bound to set an example for the potential prosecution of  4
international crimes in Syria and Iraq, where the extent of  destruction and looting of  cultural heritage 
is unprecedented.  Lastly, given that fundamentalist groups have now incorporated the destruction of  5
* Lecturer in International Law, The Hague University of  Applied Sciences; PhD (EUI); LLM (Cambridge) author may be contacted at 
marina.lostal@cantab.net. The first version of  this article was submitted in September 2016, and its last on January 10 2017. 
 For example, Jokic and Strugar were prosecuted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for the shelling of  1
the Old Town of  Dubrovnik during the Balkan war. See: The Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokić, IT-01-42/1, Sentencing Judgment (18 March 2004) 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY <www.icty.org>; The Prosecutor v Pavle Strugar, 
IT-01-42, Judgment (31 Jan 2005) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY <www.icty.org>.
 See, for example, Jonathan Jones, “Destroying priceless art is vile and offensive – but it is not a war crime”, The Guardian (22 August 2016), 2
online: <www.guardian.co.uk>.; and Marie Forestier, “ICC War Criminals: Destroying Shrines is Worse than Rape”, Foreign Policy (22 August 
2016), online: <www.foreignpolicy.com>.
 One of  them withdrew its application at the beginning of  the trial. See, for example, Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 3
Decision on Victim Participation at Trial and on Common Legal Representation of  Victims (8 June 2016) (International Criminal Court, Trial 
Chamber), online: ICC <www.icc-cpi.int>; and Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Second Report on Applications to 
Participate in the Proceedings (25 July 2016) (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber), online: ICC <www.icc-cpi.int>. See also Rome 
Statute of  the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 art 68(3) (entered into force 1 July 2002) [ICC Statute].
 International Criminal Court, Office of  the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 Sept 2016 at para 7. 4
 See, for example, Alexander A Bauer, “Editorial: The Destruction of  Heritage in Syria and Iraq and Its Implications” (2015) 22:1 Intl J 5
Cultural Property 1 at 1–6. 
	 	 	
2017 Inter Gentes Vol. 1 Issue 2 ! 	47
cultural heritage into their rhetoric and modus operandi, as seen in Libya, Egypt and Yemen,  the Al 6
Mahdi case will also serve as a point of  reference in potential domestic proceedings against 
perpetrators.  7
The first section of  this article explains the background of  the conflict in Mali and Al Mahdi’s 
role in the destruction of  cultural heritage in Timbuktu. The second explores the significance Mali’s 
cultural heritage to its population and the way this intangible side of  cultural heritage has been 
increasingly acknowledged in international law. The third one turns to an analysis of  how, at the 
confirmation of  charges hearing, the Office of  the Prosecutor rested its submissions on an 
anthropocentric reading of  the crime, and contends that this line of  reasoning is not in conformity 
with either the legal history of  the prohibition of  attacks against cultural heritage or all its goals. 
Consequently, the Prosecution’s reading should be regarded as a legal innovation. Using the example of  
the destruction of  the Buddhas of  Bamiyan, the section concludes by arguing that such legal 
innovation is not particularly helpful since, in the long run, it can restrict the capacity to prosecute 
crimes committed against cultural heritage that has no obvious significance for the local population. 
The conflict in Mali and Al Mahdi’s role in the destruction of  cultural heritage 
In April 2012, Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for 
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (known by its French acronym, MUJAO) overran Kidal, Gao and 
Timbuktu, the three northern regions of  Mali,  amidst what at the time was a non-international armed 8
conflict. All these groups wished to impose a radical interpretation of  Sharia law, which not only 
included amputations and beheadings for what they considered as serious crimes,  but also the 9
destruction of  certain religious and historic sites due to their impious nature.   10
Al Mahdi was appointed head of  the Hisbah, a morality police whose function was, in his 
words: 
[t]o ensure the promotion of  virtue and the prevention of  vice … reforming the apparent evils 
in the streets, such as the failure [of  women] to wear the veil, revealing their feminine charms, 
social mix[ing], smoking, photos, and posters displaying, for example, banned slogans.  11
The mandate of  the Hisbah also included deciding on whether or not to destroy the shrines, mosques 
and antiquities of  Timbuktu. This was significant, given that Timbuktu is an emblematic city. 
 See, for example, “UNESCO Director-General deplores destruction of  parts of  ancient city of  Baraqish, calls for protection of  Yemen’s 6
heritage”, UNESCO News (13 Sept 2015), online: <www.unesco.org>; “UNESCO Director-General Condemns Destruction to the Museum 
of  Islamic Art in Cairo, Egypt”, UNESCO News (24 Jan 2015), online: <www.unesco.org>. 
 Article 28 of  the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of  Cultural Property in the Event of  Armed Conflict directs State Parties to 7
“take, within the framework of  their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions 
upon those persons, of  whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of  the present Convention” (Hague Convention on 
the Protection of  Cultural Property in the Event of  Armed Conflict, 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 240 art 28 (entered into force 7 Aug 1956)). The 
provisions on domestic criminal prosecutions and individual criminal responsibility were further elaborated upon in Chapter 4 of  the 1999 
Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention. See Second Protocol to The Hague Convention on the Protection of  Cultural Property in the Event of  
Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999, UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/7 (entered into force 9 March 2004). 
 Isaline Bergamaschi, “French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual yet Insufficient” (2013)  2(2):20 Intl J Sec & Dev 1 at 2;  8
Maryne Rondot, “The ICC’s Investigation into Alleged War Crimes in Mali” (2013) Institute for the Study of  Human Rights, University of  
Columbia, New York: American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court (AMICC) at 2-3. 
 Human Rights Watch, “Collapse, Conflict and Atrocity in Mali: Human Rights Watch Reporting on the 2012-2013 Armed Conflict and its 9
Aftermath” (2014) at 51. 
 Anna K. Zajac, “Between Sufism and Salafism: The Rise of  Salafi Tendencies after the Arab Spring and Its Implications” (2014) 29:2 10
Hemispheres 9 at 97–98.
 ICC, “Collection of  footage presented by the OTP during the Confirmation of  Charges hearing” (1 March 2015), online: https://www.icc-11
cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi; see also, ICC, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence (27 September 2016).
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Historically, it “played a crucial role in the expansion of  Islam in the region”,  and it is a part of  12
UNESCO’s World Heritage List of  sites deemed of  outstanding universal value for the whole of  
humanity.  13
From the outset, Al Mahdi admitted his guilt.  As his trial began, he sought the pardon of  the 14
people of  Timbuktu with the following words: 
It is with deep regret and with great pain I have to enter a guilty plea and all the charges 
brought against me are accurate and correct. I am really sorry, I am really remorseful and I 
regret all the damage that my actions have caused.  15
As this was the first time that an accused person had pleaded guilty at the ICC, the Trial Chamber 
dedicated some time to clarifying the parameters of  this line of  action in the Court. The ICC Statute 
does not allow plea bargaining – that is, reaching an agreement with the prosecution whereby the 
defendant pleads guilty to some or all of  the charges in exchange (for example) for a reduced sentence. 
While Article 65(5) of  the ICC Statute permits negotiations between the prosecution and the defence, 
the results of  these discussions are not binding on the Court. In this case, the Prosecution 
recommended a sentence of  between nine and eleven years’ imprisonment.  Although the Trial 16
Chamber could have imposed up to thirty years, Al Mahdi was finally sentenced to nine. In reaching 
this decision, the Trial Chamber considered the admission of  guilt to be a mitigating circumstance  and 17
gave it substantial weight, although it also noted that the admission was “made against a backdrop of  
overwhelming evidence”.   18
The legal basis for the crime committed by Al Mahdi lies in Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of  the ICC 
Statute, which gives the following definition of  the war crime of  attacks against property: 
Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or 
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected, provided they are not military objectives.  19
The Trial Chamber decided that no re-characterization of  the charges was necessary under Article 8(2)
(e)(xii), which punishes instead “destroying or seizing the property of  an adversary unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of  the conflict”, since this article 
refers to the more general crime against civilian property.  Albeit lex specialis, the reader should note 20
  Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgement and Sentence (public), (27 September 2016) at para 78 (International 12
Criminal Court, Trial Chamber VIII), online: ICC <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
  See Convention Concerning the Protection of  the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 Nov 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 at preamble and art 13
1 (entered into force 17 Dec 1975) [World Heritage Convention].
 See Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Dépôt de l'Accord sur l'aveu de culpabilité de M. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (19 14
Aug 2016) (International Criminal Court, Preliminary Chamber), online: ICC <www.icc-cpi.int> [Accord sur l’aveu].
 Prosecutor v. Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, “Al Mahdi Case: accused makes an admission of  guilt at trial opening” (22 August 15
2016), online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Regsy114ovI&feature=youtu.be>.
 Accord sur l’aveu, supra note 14, at 19; see also, Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Public redacted version of  16
"Prosecution’s submissions on sentencing" in the Al Mahdi case (22 July 2016), at para 65 (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber VIII), 
online: ICC <www.icc-cpi.int> [Prosecution's submissions on sentencing]..
 The Trial Chamber found four other mitigating circumstances: his cooperation with the Prosecution; the remorse and empathy expressed 17
for the victims; his initial reluctance to carry out the destruction; and his good behaviour in detention. Supra note 11 at para 109.
 Ibid at para 100.18
 The ICC Statute contains an identical provision applicable in international armed conflicts in Article 8(2)(b)(ix) (See ICC Statute, supra note 19
3 at Article 8(2)(b)(ix)). 
 Supra note 11 at para 12. 20
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that the war crime concerning attacks against cultural heritage in the ICC Statute suffers from a far-
from negligible blind spot: the lack of  reference to movable objects.  Cultural property may also take 21
the form of  objects such as paintings, figurines, relics or, as in the case of  Timbuktu, ancient 
manuscripts. Indeed, UNESCO reports that “4,203 manuscripts from the Ahmed Baba research centre 
were lost”  during the conflict and around 300,000 were in urgent need of  conservation. Nevertheless, 22
this loss of  Malian cultural heritage was not taken into account at the ICC proceedings. 
The Trial Chamber found that Al Mahdi had been involved in the destruction of  ten historical 
and religious sites,  and all but the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum were world 23
heritage sites. At first, Al Mahdi advised against destroying the mausoleums “so as to maintain [good] 
relations between the population and the occupying groups.”  However, after receiving instructions 24
from Ag Ghaly (the leader of  Ansar Dine) and Abou Zeid (the governor of  Timbuktu during its 
occupation by the armed groups), he agreed to proceed with the destruction and was present at each 
incident. He decided on the order in which the destruction was carried out, and he even drafted a 
sermon justifying the attacks that was read out at Friday prayers.  25
More specifically, Al Mahdi admitted to having been involved in the destruction of  nine 
mausoleums and the door of  the mosque of  Sidi Yahia.  The buildings were often surrounded by 26
security cordons of  armed men to ensure that the destruction took place without disruption. Although 
Al Mahdi’s degree of  involvement varied, he directly participated in the destruction of  the Alpha Moya 
Mausoleum, the Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi Mausoleum and the two mausoleums 
adjoining the Djingareyber Mosque, the Ahmed Fulane Mausoleum and the Bahaber Babadié 
Mausoleum  – he even recommended the use of  a bulldozer on the latter. As for the Sidi Yahia 27
Mosque, it was later established that only its door had been destroyed. Nevertheless, this door carried 
particular meaning for the local population: it had been sealed since time immemorial because it was 
thought to protect against the evil eye. Indeed, “some witnesses started crying when they saw the 
damage”;  they believed that “opening the door [would] herald misfortune”.  In light of  this, the Pre-28 29
Trial Chamber of  the ICC took the view that “[t]hese buildings were cherished by the community, were 
used for religious practices […] and embodied the identity of  the city”.  Al Mahdi personally 30
purchased the pickaxes used at the site with Hisbah funds, and he justified the destruction of  the door 
to the media as a way of  “eradicating superstition, heresy and all things or subterfuge which can lead to 
idolatry.”  31
 Micaela Frulli, “The Criminalization of  Offences against Cultural Heritage in Times of  Armed Conflict: The Quest for 21
Consistency” (2001) 22:1 EJIL 203 at 212.
 “Damage to Timbuktu’s cultural heritage worse than first estimated reports UNESCO mission”, UNESCO News (7 June 2013), online: 22
<http://en.unesco.org/news/damage-timbuktu%E2%80%99s-cultural-heritage-worse-first-estimated-reports-unesco-mission>.
 Namely: Sidi Mahmoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit; Cheick Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani;  Cheikh Sidi Mokhtar Ben Sidi Mouhammad 23
Ben Cheick Alkabir;  Alpha Moya; Cheick Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi;  Cheick Mouhamad El Micky; Cheick Abdoul Kassim Attouaty; 
Ahamed Fulane and Bahaber Babadié; and the mosque of  Sidi Yahia.
 Supra note 11 at para 36.24
 Ibid at para 37.25
 Procureur c Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15 Mandat d'arrêt (publique expurgée), (18 September 2015) at 3 (Cour Pénale 26
Internationale, Chambre Préliminaire I), online : ICC < https://www.icc-cpi.int>.
 Supra note 11 at para 38.27
 “Timbuktu's Sidi Yahia mosque ’attacked by Mali militants’”, BBC News (2 July 2012), online: < http://www.bbc.com/news/world-28
africa-18675539>.
 Ibid.29
 Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on the Confirmation of  Charges against Al Faqi Al Mahdi (public) (24 March 30
2016) at 23, para 11 (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I), online: ICC <www.icc-cpi.int>.www.icc-cpi.int>.
 Supra note 11 at para 38(viii).31
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Al Mahdi is currently awaiting the reparation stage of  the proceedings, where the Trial 
Chamber will decide on some form of  compensation, rehabilitation or symbolic measures for the 
victims. 
The intangible nature of  the heritage destroyed in Mali 
Timbuktu is sometimes referred to as the ‘City of  the 333 (Sufi) Saints’; these saints are 
believed to lie buried in its sixteen mausoleums. It also houses thousands of  sacred manuscripts, many 
dating back to the 13th century, and contains three ancient mosques – Djingrayber, Sidi Yahia (both 
affected by the conflict) and Sankoré.  Sufism, one of  the many different currents within Islam, is 32
accused by followers of  Salafism (the creed espoused by fundamentalist groups) of  being polytheist.  33
It was the so-called ‘idolatrous’ nature of  these mausoleums and mosques that led to the destruction of  
several of  them between May and July 2012.  34
Al Mahdi was instructed to observe the behavior of  the local population and pilgrims at these 
sites, and to warn against their practices in an attempt to stop the religious rites.  For example, the 35
Sheikh Sidi El Mokhtar Ben Sidi Mouhammad Al Kabir Al Kounti Mausoleum was a popular 
destination for pilgrims from across Mali and beyond; the Alpha Moya Mausoleum was regularly visited 
by Muslims in order “to pray and make offerings;”  the Sheikh Mouhamad El Mikki Mausoleum 36
represented “a place of  spiritual retreat and reflection;”  and the two mausoleums attached to the 37
Djingareyber Mosque were used twice a week for religious purposes.  As the Trial Chamber 38
acknowledged, these sites: 
were of  great importance to the people of  Timbuktu, who admired them and were attached to 
them. They reflected their commitment to Islam and played a psychological role to the extent 
of  being perceived as protecting the people of  Timbuktu.  39
One unprecedented aspect of  the Al Mahdi case that deserves scrutiny is the attention paid to the 
impact that the destruction of  the shrines and mosques had on the population of  Timbuktu. During 
the confirmation of  charges hearing, a crucial stage in the proceedings,  the Prosecution highlighted 40
the intangible nature of  cultural heritage. The early instruments applicable to armed conflicts, such as 
the 1907 IV Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of  War on Land (1907 IV Hague 
Regulations) and the landmark 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of  Cultural Property in the 
Event of  Armed Conflict (1954 Hague Convention), had not really taken this aspect into account. As 
the discourse of  human rights became mainstream, the approach to cultural objects changed. Whereas, 
previously, it was common to refer to such buildings and objects as ‘cultural property’, now it is more 
 Direction Nationale du Patrimoine Culture & Ministère de la Culture, Rapport: Etat actuel de conservation du bien Tombouctou (République du 32
Mali : Direction Nationale du Patrimoine Culture et Ministère de la Culture,  2014) at 2.
 Anna K Zajac, “Between Sufism and Salafism: The Rise of  Salafi Tendencies After the Arab Spring and its Implications ” (2014) 29:2 33
Hemispheres at 97-98.
 ICC, Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report (16 January 2013) at 11. 34
 Supra note 11 at para 35.35
 Ibid at para 38(iv).36
 Ibid at para 38(v).37
 Ibid at para 38(ix).38
 Ibid at para 78.39
 Put roughly, at the confirmation of  charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber acts as a gatekeeper pronouncing on whether the case is admissible. Its 40
decision is based, inter alia, on the gravity of  the crime – See s 17 and 61 of  the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court, 17 July 
1998, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9 [ICC Statute]. 
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appropriate to refer to ‘cultural heritage’, an expression that captures its immaterial dimension.  41
It has since become a truism that the tangible and intangible nature of  cultural heritage are 
often two sides of  the same coin. According to the Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the right of  everyone to “take part in cultural life” enshrined in Article 15(1)(c) of  the Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is “associated with the use of  cultural goods”.  Former UN 42
Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed, was of  the view that “access to and enjoyment 
of  cultural heritage as a human right is a necessary and complementary approach to the  preservation/
safeguard[ing] of  cultural heritage”.  The present Special Rapporteur, Karima Bennoune, has given 43
priority to the intentional destruction of  cultural heritage as a violation of  human rights and, in a 
related report, has acknowledged that “cultural heritage is to be understood as the resources enabling 
the cultural identification and development processes of  individuals and groups, which they, implicitly 
or explicitly, wish to transmit to future generations”.  In line with this reasoning, UNESCO adopted 44
two treaties emphasizing the immaterial side of  cultural heritage: the Convention for the Safeguarding 
of  the Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2003  and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of  45
the Diversity of  Cultural Expressions in 2005.  46
It is often useful to acknowledge the intimate connection that generally exists between the 
material and immaterial dimensions of  cultural heritage. For example, recognition of  the symbolic 
weight of  cultural heritage can play a crucial role in devising peace processes and reconciliation 
strategies.  The impact of  the destruction of  cultural heritage on individuals and the community is also 47
relevant for determining the form and amount of  reparations owed to victims, and for assessing the 
gravity of  the crime when passing sentence. In fact, the Trial Chamber noted at the Al Mahdi trial that 
the “symbolic and emotional value for the inhabitants of  Timbuktu [was] relevant in assessing the 
gravity of  the crime committed”  and, given its world heritage listing, the attack also affected “people 48
throughout Mali and the international community”.  49
In contrast to this general trend, however, focusing on the intangible side of  cultural heritage 
during the confirmation of  charges phase, as happened in the Al Mahdi case, is not a particularly 
helpful long-term strategy for the prosecution of  such crimes. This anthropocentric focus, as we shall 
see, constitutes a legal innovation that is not only historically inaccurate but, most importantly, may 
narrow the scope of  the protection afforded to tangible cultural heritage.  
The Prosecution’s strategy at the confirmation of  charges: “What is at stake here is not just 
walls and stones” 
 See Lyndel V Prott & Patrick J O’Keefe, “‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural Property’?” (1992) 1:2 International Journal of  Cultural Property 41
307.
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment no 21, ESC 43rd, UN Doc E/C12/GC/21 (2009) at s 15(b).  42
 Farida Shaheed, Report of  the independent expert in the field of  cultural rights Farida Shadeed, HRC, 2011, A/HRC/17/38 at para 2.43
 Karima Bennoune, Report of  the Special Rapporteur in the field of  cultural rights, HRC, 2016, A/HRC/31/59 at para 47.44
 Convention for the Safeguarding of  the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 17 October 2003, 2368 UNTS 1 (entered into force 20 April 2006), online: 45
<treaties.un.org >.
 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of  the Diversity of  Cultural Expressions, 20 October 2005, 2440 UNTS 311 online: <treaties.un.org>.46
 See Dacia Viejo-Rose, “Reconstructing Heritage in the Aftermath of  Civil War: Re-Visioning the Nation and the Implications of  47
International Involvement” (2013) 7:2 Journal of  Intervention and Statebuilding 125; Marina Lostal & Emma Cunliffe, “Cultural heritage that 
heals: factoring in cultural heritage discourses in the Syrian peacebuilding process” (2016) 7:2-3 The Historic Environment: Policy & Practice 
248.
 Supra note 11 at para 79.48
 Ibid at para 80.49
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The confirmation of  charges at the ICC is an initial part of  the proceedings in which the Pre-
Trial Chamber must determine “whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed each of  the crimes charged”  and, if  so, to confirm those charges. 50
At this stage, the Pre-Trial Chamber may also pronounce on whether the case at hand meets the ‘gravity 
threshold’, according to which, if  the case is not of  sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court, it will be declared inadmissible.  In a previous instance, the Pre-Trial Chamber conceded that 51
“all crimes that fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of  the Court [such as the destruction of  
cultural heritage] are serious”,  but that the gravity threshold requirement acted as an “additional 52
safeguard which prevents the Court from investigating, prosecuting and trying peripheral cases”.   53
Given that the Al Mahdi case represents a historical first, in that it was solely centred on the 
damage and destruction of  cultural heritage, and taking into account the ICC’s current crisis of  
legitimacy,  the gravity threshold must have been a particular concern for the Office of  the Prosecutor 54
– even more so in light of  the ongoing criticisms it received for devoting attention to a crime against 
property. Amnesty International and the International Federation for Human Rights, for example, 
expressed “some public reservations that the ICC had advanced his case while other crimes [in Mali], 
such as the murder, rape, and torture of  civilians, had not received the same degree of  attention”.  55
Perhaps wary of  the perception that crimes against property are too detached from human suffering, 
the Chief  Prosecutor of  the ICC, Fatou Bensouda – immediately after the transfer of  Al Mahdi to The 
Hague – referred to the attacks against the mausoleums as a “callous assault on the dignity and identity 
of  entire populations, their religious and historical roots”,  and further added that “[t]he inhabitants of  56
Northern Mali [are] the main victims of  these attacks”.  This political statement acquired a legal 57
dimension when the Prosecution followed this anthropocentric line of  reasoning at the confirmation 
of  charges hearing. Bensouda submitted: 
Let us be clear: What is at stake here is not just walls and stones. The destroyed mausoleums 
were important from a religious point of  view, from an historical point of  view and from an 
identity point of  view.  58
The Prosecution went on to address a number of  necessary technical concerns, such as the five 
elements of  the war crime against cultural heritage in relation to the accused,  and the modes of  59
liability applicable to Al Mahdi.  However, this was placed in a context where the impact on human 60
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 Ibid, s 17(1)(d), 19.51
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Review 475.
 Iain Macleod & Shehzad Charania, “Three challenges for the International Criminal Court” (16 November 2015), OUPblog (blog), online: 54
<https://blog.oup.com/2015/11/three-challenges-international-criminal-court/>.
 Brian I Daniels, “Is the destruction of  cultural property a war crime?”, Apollo (28 November 2016) online: <https://www.apollo-55
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lives and human suffering was emphasized as the driving force behind the prosecution of  the crime: 
Madam President, your Honours, the Rome Statute prohibits and punishes the most 
reprehensible criminal acts: Crimes of  genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
These crimes can be perpetrated in various forms, but they all have one common denominator: 
They inflict irreparable damage to the human persons in his or her body, mind, soul and 
identity. 
[…] 
Such an attack against buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments falls into the 
category of  crimes that destroy the roots of  an entire people and profoundly and irremediably 
affect its social practices and structures. This is precisely why such acts constitute a crime under 
Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of  the Rome Statute.  61
Albeit politically strategic, affording such prominence to the intangible dimension of  the destruction of  
cultural heritage at the confirmation of  charges was historically inaccurate and, most importantly, 
potentially counterproductive for future prosecutions. 
The History of  the Prohibition of  Attacks Against Cultural Heritage 
Notwithstanding the Chief  Prosecutor’s statement, concrete human suffering and victimization 
are not the rationale behind the crime against cultural heritage as enshrined in the ICC Statute. 
Historically, the existence of  this crime has not been linked to questions of  identity, the human right to 
take part in cultural life, or freedom of  thought or religion. In fact, the existence of  a prohibition of  
attacks against cultural heritage predates the human rights movement altogether. 
Emerich de Vattel, an 18th-century Swiss jurist and diplomat, began codifying the laws of  war 
in his major work, Les Droits des Gens (1758). In paragraph 168, ‘What things are to be spared’, he 
identified the emergence of  a new norm prohibiting the pillage and wanton destruction of  cultural 
property: 
For whatever cause a country is ravaged, we ought to spare those edifices which do honour to 
human society, and do not contribute to increase the enemy’s strength — such as temples, 
tombs, public buildings, and all works of  remarkable beauty. What advantage is obtained by 
destroying them? It is declaring one’s self  an enemy to mankind, thus wantonly to deprive 
them of  these monuments of  art and models of  taste; and in that light Belisarius represented 
the matter to Tittila, king of  the Goths. We still detest those barbarians who destroyed so many 
wonders of  art, when they overran the Roman Empire.  62
Nevertheless, he also contended that if  it was “necessary to destroy edifices of  that nature in order to 
carry on the operations of  war, or to advance the works in a siege, we have an undoubted right to take 
such a step”.  This is essentially the dual approach that international law follows today in respect to 63
cultural property. The basic rule of  the 1954 Hague Convention is that cultural property and its 
surroundings shall not be made the object of  an attack or be used for military purposes unless it is 
 Ibid at 12–13 (emphasis added). The confirmation of  charges decision reached by the Pre-Trial Chamber took note of  this anthropocentric 61
turn of  the crime against cultural heritage, observing that “the Buildings/Structures played an important role in the life of  the inhabitants of  
Timbuktu and that their destruction was considered as a serious matter and regarded by the local population as an aggression towards their 
faith”; see Confirmation of  Charges, supra note 29 at 39.
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required by military necessity.  64
This prohibition became binding instructions for the Union Army during the American Civil 
War when Abraham Lincoln sanctioned the so-called ‘Lieber Code’ of  1863. Article 35 stated that 
“classical works of  art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments … must be secured 
against all avoidable injury”.  Later, in 1899, Tsar Nicholas II convened the First Hague Peace 65
Conference whose goal was to revise the laws and customs of  war laid down in the 1874 Brussels 
Declaration, an instrument that had never entered into force. The 1899 Annex to The Hague 
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of  War on Land contained provisions 
demanding respect for institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences.  66
In 1907 a Second International Peace Conference revisited the laws and customs of  war. These were 
adopted in the IV Hague Regulations, which now represent customary international law.  Article 27 of  67
the 1907 IV Hague Regulations states: 
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, 
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used 
at the time for military purposes.  68
There have been later instruments dedicated to the protection of  cultural property in armed conflict, 
such as the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1999 Second Protocol, that are more comprehensive, but 
Article 27 of  the 1907 IV Hague Regulations is the provision that inspired the definition of  the war 
crime of  directing attacks against cultural heritage that is enshrined in the ICC Statute. In 1907, 
however, a general acceptance of  the concept of  international human rights was decades away (i.e. 
1948), and discourses on the intrinsic connection between the tangible and intangible aspects of  
cultural heritage only appeared around a century later (i.e. the adoption of  the UNESCO Convention 
on Intangible Cultural Heritage took place in 2003). In fact, cultural heritage was not even a topic in 
and of  itself. As such, the Chief  Prosecutor’s affirmation in the Al Mahdi case that the profound effect 
wrought on a people’s social practices and structures “is precisely why such acts [of  destruction] 
constitute a crime under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of  the Rome Statute” is a legal invention.  69
The ICC’s set of  five conditions that need to be proven in order to establish whether a crime 
against cultural heritage has been committed present a tangible definition, and are thus more consistent 
with the legal past of  this prohibition: 
1. The perpetrator directed an attack;  
2. The object of  the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and 
wounded are collected, which were not military objectives;  
3. The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and 
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 See UN Security Council, Report of  the Secretary-General (S/25704).67
 International Conferences (The Hague),  Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of  War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 68
Concerning the Laws and Customs of  War on Land, 18 October 1907.
  Transcript of  the Confirmation of  Charges, supra note 58 at 12.69
	 	 	
2017 Inter Gentes Vol. 1 Issue 2 ! 	55
wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of  the attack;   
4. The conduct took place in the context of  and was associated with an armed conflict not of  
an international character;  
5. The perpetrator was aware of  factual circumstances that established the existence of  an 
armed conflict.  70
It follows that inflicting harm or suffering on the population is immaterial to the existence of  the crime 
of  attacks against cultural heritage. Human suffering should not be put forward as a requirement to 
prove that the crime meets the gravity threshold for admissibility purposes as this would amount to 
revisiting the definition of  the crime. 
Moreover, if  the anthropocentric reading espoused by the Office of  the Prosecution took hold, 
the ICC (and all courts that follow its example) would potentially be turning a blind eye to episodes of  
damage and destruction that do not affect the social or cultural practices of  a specific population. This 
is not an improbable scenario: it actually took place in 2001, when the Buddhas of  Bamiyan in 
Afghanistan were destroyed. 
The Buddhas of  Bamiyan: The Destruction of  Buddhist ‘Idols’ in a Muslim Country 
The Buddhas of  Bamiyan were two monumental statues – situated in the Bamiyan valley in 
Afghanistan – which had been placed on the Afghan Tentative List of  World Heritage in expectation 
of  entry in the renowned World Heritage List. It is estimated that they were built around the 5th 
century,  and one may have been “the largest [standing] Buddha … in the world”.  At the feet of  71 72
these gigantic statues lay a community of  Buddhist monasteries, which welcomed worshippers and 
sightseers from around the world.  These monuments represented a historic cultural landmark for 73
Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike for around 1,500 years, particularly during the golden era of  the Silk 
Road. 
In 2001, the Taliban had gained control over 90 percent of  Afghanistan, and the situation had 
changed dramatically.  Taliban rule was noted for its “absolute lack of  freedom of  expression and [its] 74
total ban on pictures”,  which it regarded as the products of  infidel religions. Mullah Omar, leader of  75
the Taliban at the time, encouraged the removal of  all traces of  non-Islamic cultural heritage from 
Afghan territory.  This policy was reinforced by the publication of  a decree by the Afghan Supreme 76
Court ordering the destruction of  the Buddhas,  and the statues were consequently dynamited over a 77
period of  ten days in March 2001. 
The international community reacted with shock and outrage. In 2003, UNESCO adopted the 
Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of  Cultural Heritage as an explicit reaction to the 
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“tragic destruction of  the Buddhas of  Bamiyan that affected the international community as a 
whole”.  78
One statement in particular deserves attention here. The destruction of  the Buddhas led the 
then-UNESCO Director-General, Koïchiro Matsuura, to speak of  “crimes against culture”.  This was 79
pure rhetoric. Firstly, the destruction of  the Buddhas happened during peacetime and there is no crime 
against cultural heritage enforceable outside armed conflict, at least at the international level. Secondly, 
Afghanistan deposited its instrument of  accession to the ICC Statute on 10 February 2003 and, in 
principle, the Court could only start exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory or by 
its nationals after 1 May 2003.  
But what would happen if  the destruction of  the Buddhas occurred during an armed conflict 
today? In such a case, the ICC’s Office of  the Prosecutor could launch an investigation, and if  it did so, 
it would find that the destruction of  the shrines in Mali and the Buddhas of  Bamiyan share some 
relevant similarities. Both events represented acts of  sheer iconoclasm and both followed a policy 
decreeing the removal of  all ‘infidel’ traces. In relation to the Buddhas, the text of  the Afghan Supreme 
Court decree clearly stated: 
[T]hese idols have been gods of  the infidels, and these are respected even now and perhaps 
maybe turned into gods again. The real God is only Allah, and all other false gods should be 
removed.  80
In a similar vein, a spokesperson for Ansar Dine reportedly declared in the aftermath of  the 
destruction of  the shrines in Mali: “There is no world heritage. It does not exist. Infidels must not get 
involved in our business.”  81
While Timbuktu was added to the World Heritage List in 1988, the Buddhas of  Bamiyan were 
part of  the Afghan Tentative List of  World Heritage  and were missing a formal requirement for their 82
definitive inscription on the World Heritage List at the time they were destroyed. However, technically 
speaking, the fact that a property constituting cultural heritage has not been included on the World 
Heritage List “shall in no way be construed to mean that it does not have an outstanding universal 
value”.  Thus, both sites represented cultural heritage of  outstanding universal value and, as a 83
consequence, its deterioration or disappearance equally constitute “a harmful impoverishment of  the 
heritage of  all the nations of  the world”.  84
There is, however, a major difference between the two episodes: whereas the affected shrines in 
Timbuktu were used by the local population in their religious practices,  there are no records indicating 85
the presence of  Buddhism in Afghanistan after 1336.  The intangible dimension of  the crime as 86
understood by the Chief  Prosecutor would therefore be missing in the case of  the Buddhas: their 
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destruction could not affect the social practices and structures or the cultural roots of  the local people. 
It would lack what the Chief  Prosecutor has pointed to as the common denominator of  all crimes 
detailed by the ICC Statute – that is, that “[t]hey inflict irreparable damage to the human persons in his 
or her body, mind, soul and identity”.  According to this reasoning, unlike the shrines of  Timbuktu, 87
the destruction of  the Buddhas would not warrant prosecution as a war crime before the ICC. 
Turning consequences for the local population into ingredients for the gravity threshold of  the 
crime against cultural heritage may have the adverse effect of  rendering instances of  the destruction of  
sites protected under international law (due to their importance for the whole of  humanity) 
inadmissible. For example, given the disappearance of  the Mayan civilization, the (hypothetical) 
obliteration in armed conflict of  the Mayan site of  Chichen Itza in Mexico would not square with the 
reading proposed for this crime. The same would happen in the case of  the destruction of  the so-called 
‘forgotten cities’ in Syria, a group of  “40 villages grouped in eight parks situated in north-western Syria 
[which provide a] remarkable testimony to rural life in late Antiquity and during the Byzantine 
period”,  which, as their name suggests, were abandoned many centuries ago. What is more, if  damage 88
to social practices and structures was “precisely why such acts constitute a crime under Article 8(2)(e)
(iv) of  the Rome Statute”,  would it stop being a war crime if  all the population agreed through a 89
referendum to the defacing of  statues or demolition of  historical places of  worship? Likewise, would it 
stop being a crime if  the defence was able to prove that the population did not feel any attachment to 
the cultural properties? It is in no one’s interest to exclude such episodes from the definition of  the 
crime and, for this reason, the Office of  the Prosecution should avoid re-defining its boundaries. 
In the judgment and sentence of  Al Mahdi, Trial Chamber VII was relatively faithful to the 
history and legal contours of  the crime.  It considered the symbolic and emotional value of  the 90
destroyed buildings for the inhabitants of  Timbuktu as relevant in assessing the gravity of  the crime 
and thus in determining the appropriate sentence.  However, in so doing, the Chamber acknowledged 91
that “even if  inherently grave, crimes against property are generally of  lesser gravity than crimes against 
persons”.  92
Conclusion 
The conflict in Mali is part of  a larger pattern of  conflicts taking place across the Sahel and the 
Middle East, including in Syria, Iraq and Libya. Despite their initially secular motivations (in the case of  
Mali, a Tuareg-led rebellion against the central administration in Bamako), these conflicts have been 
hijacked by fundamentalist groups with different names (Ansar Dine, AQIM, MUJAO, ISIS) but a 
similar purpose: that of  imposing a new reading of  society, order and religion on the populations of  
these regions. This necessitates the eradication and denial of  their past and their identity, and entails the 
destruction (and looting) of  cultural heritage.  
In a context where the arsenal of  war now includes the destruction of  historical and religious 
sites, the Al Mahdi case has put the crime of  directing attacks against cultural heritage back on the map 
and sent a clear warning of  the legal consequences. It has provided a unique legal precedent, and 
legitimized the inclusion and treatment of  such acts of  destruction in other conflicts around the world 
as war crimes.  
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Nevertheless, while the Prosecution was right to contend that the “intentional destruction of  
cultural property is by nature a serious crime”,  this destruction – contrary to the Prosecution’s 93
submission – is not always “aimed at erasing the cultural identity and heritage of  a population”.  94
Although it is a less widely known scenario, destruction of  cultural property may also happen for 
reasons unrelated to a population’s identity and the wish to re-write history. For example, the Syrian 
armed forces bombarded the medieval fortress of  Crac des Chevaliers (a Syrian world heritage site) in 
July 2013, but it did so in pursuit of  its quest to reconquer the city of  Homs. 
Local peoples, more often than not, feel victimised by the looting, damage or disappearance of  
what they consider to be ‘their’ heritage. This is something that should not be neglected, and there are 
mechanisms within the ICC to ensure that the views of  victims are heard throughout the proceedings 
and, if  appropriate, that they are compensated for their loss. However, as this article argues, the 
anthropocentric reading of  the Al Mahdi proceedings at the confirmation of  charges stage merely paid 
lip service to the history behind this crime and compromised future prosecutions by limiting the ambit 
of  its application.  
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